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Break Process Trees (T1036.009) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Stealth . An adversary may attempt to evade process tree based analysis by modifying executed malware's parent process ID (PPID).
Break Process Trees (T1036.009) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Stealth. An adversary may attempt to evade process tree-based analysis by modifying executed malware's parent process ID (PPID).
Attackers use Break Process Trees because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Stealth tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on Linux, macOS environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
An adversary may attempt to evade process tree-based analysis by modifying executed malware's parent process ID (PPID). If endpoint protection software leverages the “parent-child" relationship for detection, breaking this relationship could result in the adversary’s behavior not being associated with previous process tree activity. On Unix-based systems breaking this process tree is common practice for administrators to execute software using scripts and programs.(Citation: 3OHA double-fork 2022)
On Linux systems, adversaries may execute a series of Native API calls to alter malware's process tree. For example, adversaries can execute their payload without any arguments, call the fork() API call twice, then have the parent process exit. This creates a grandchild process with no parent process that is immediately adopted by the init system process (PID 1), which successfully disconnects the execution of the adversary's payload from its previous process tree.
Another example is using the “daemon†syscall to detach from the current parent process and run in the background.(Citation: Sandfly BPFDoor 2022)(Citation: Microsoft XorDdos Linux Stealth 2022)
No universal command represents Break Process Trees. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|---|---|
| Not universally applicable | Validate platform coverage | This technique may not produce a Windows event; use telemetry native to the affected platform. |
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.
No MITRE mitigations mapped to this technique.