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Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non C2 Protocol (T1048.001) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Exfiltration . Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a symmetrically encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel.
Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol (T1048.001) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Exfiltration. Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a symmetrically encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel.
Attackers use Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Exfiltration tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on Linux, macOS, Windows, ESXi environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a symmetrically encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
Symmetric encryption algorithms are those that use shared or the same keys/secrets on each end of the channel. This requires an exchange or pre-arranged agreement/possession of the value used to encrypt and decrypt data.
Network protocols that use asymmetric encryption often utilize symmetric encryption once keys are exchanged, but adversaries may opt to manually share keys and implement symmetric cryptographic algorithms (ex: RC4, AES) vice using mechanisms that are baked into a protocol. This may result in multiple layers of encryption (in protocols that are natively encrypted such as HTTPS) or encryption in protocols that not typically encrypted (such as HTTP or FTP).
No universal command represents Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Relevant Windows channel(s) | Correlate authentication, process, object-access, and configuration events with the observed execution context. |
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.