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Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non C2 Protocol (T1048.003) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Exfiltration . Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel.
Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol (T1048.003) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Exfiltration. Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel.
Attackers use Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Exfiltration tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.(Citation: copy_cmd_cisco)
Adversaries may opt to obfuscate this data, without the use of encryption, within network protocols that are natively unencrypted (such as HTTP, FTP, or DNS). This may include custom or publicly available encoding/compression algorithms (such as base64) as well as embedding data within protocol headers and fields.
No universal command represents Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Relevant Windows channel(s) | Correlate authentication, process, object-access, and configuration events with the observed execution context. |
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.