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Credential API Hooking (T1056.004) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Collection, Credential Access . Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions and Linux system functions to collect user credentials.
Credential API Hooking (T1056.004) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Collection, Credential Access. Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions and Linux system functions to collect user credentials.
Attackers use Credential API Hooking because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Collection, Credential Access tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on Windows, Linux, macOS environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions and Linux system functions to collect user credentials. Malicious hooking mechanisms may capture API or function calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials.(Citation: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017) Unlike Keylogging, this technique focuses specifically on API functions that include parameters that reveal user credentials.
In Windows, hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via:
In Linux and macOS, adversaries may hook into system functions via the LD_PRELOAD (Linux) or DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES (macOS) environment variables, which enables loading shared libraries into a program’s address space. For example, an adversary may capture credentials by hooking into the libc read function leveraged by SSH or SCP.(Citation: Intezer Symbiote 2022)
No universal command represents Credential API Hooking. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Relevant Windows channel(s) | Correlate authentication, process, object-access, and configuration events with the observed execution context. |
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.
No MITRE mitigations mapped to this technique.