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Cloud Account (T1087.004) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Discovery . Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of cloud accounts.
Cloud Account (T1087.004) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Discovery. Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of cloud accounts.
Attackers use Cloud Account because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Discovery tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on IaaS, Identity Provider, Office Suite, SaaS environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of cloud accounts. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application.
With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find accounts. The <code>Get-MsolRoleMember</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain account names given a role or permissions group in Office 365.(Citation: Microsoft msolrolemember)(Citation: GitHub Raindance) The Azure CLI (AZ CLI) also provides an interface to obtain user accounts with authenticated access to a domain. The command <code>az ad user list</code> will list all users within a domain.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)
The AWS command <code>aws iam list-users</code> may be used to obtain a list of users in the current account while <code>aws iam list-roles</code> can obtain IAM roles that have a specified path prefix.(Citation: AWS List Roles)(Citation: AWS List Users) In GCP, <code>gcloud iam service-accounts list</code> and <code>gcloud projects get-iam-policy</code> may be used to obtain a listing of service accounts and users in a project.(Citation: Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API)
No universal command represents Cloud Account. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|---|---|
| Not universally applicable | Validate platform coverage | This technique may not produce a Windows event; use telemetry native to the affected platform. |
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.