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Clipboard Data (T1115) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Collection . Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.
Clipboard Data (T1115) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Collection. Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.
Attackers use Clipboard Data because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Collection tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on Linux, macOS, Windows environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.
For example, on Windows adversaries can access clipboard data by using <code>clip.exe</code> or <code>Get-Clipboard</code>.(Citation: MSDN Clipboard)(Citation: clip_win_server)(Citation: CISA_AA21_200B) Additionally, adversaries may monitor then replace users’ clipboard with their data (e.g., Transmitted Data Manipulation).(Citation: mining_ruby_reversinglabs)
macOS and Linux also have commands, such as <code>pbpaste</code>, to grab clipboard contents.(Citation: Operating with EmPyre)
No universal command represents Clipboard Data. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Relevant Windows channel(s) | Correlate authentication, process, object-access, and configuration events with the observed execution context. |
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.
No MITRE mitigations mapped to this technique.