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Add ins (T1137.006) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Persistence . Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office add ins to obtain persistence on a compromised system.
Add-ins (T1137.006) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Persistence. Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office add-ins to obtain persistence on a compromised system.
Attackers use Add-ins because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Persistence tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on Windows, Office Suite environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office add-ins to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Office add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs. (Citation: Microsoft Office Add-ins) There are different types of add-ins that can be used by the various Office products; including Word/Excel add-in Libraries (WLL/XLL), VBA add-ins, Office Component Object Model (COM) add-ins, automation add-ins, VBA Editor (VBE), Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins, and Outlook add-ins. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)(Citation: FireEye Mail CDS 2018)
Add-ins can be used to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute code when an Office application starts.
No universal command represents Add-ins. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Relevant Windows channel(s) | Correlate authentication, process, object-access, and configuration events with the observed execution context. |
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.