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Compromise Software Supply Chain (T1195.002) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Initial Access . Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.
Compromise Software Supply Chain (T1195.002) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Initial Access. Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.
Attackers use Compromise Software Supply Chain because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Initial Access tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on Linux, Windows, macOS environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.
Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011)
No universal command represents Compromise Software Supply Chain. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Relevant Windows channel(s) | Correlate authentication, process, object-access, and configuration events with the observed execution context. |
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.