Code Repositories

Executive Summary

Code Repositories (T1213.003) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Collection. Adversaries may leverage code repositories to collect valuable information.

Why Attackers Use It

Attackers use Code Repositories because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Collection tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on SaaS environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.

MITRE Description

Adversaries may leverage code repositories to collect valuable information. Code repositories are tools/services that store source code and automate software builds. They may be hosted internally or privately on third party sites such as Github, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically interact with code repositories through a web application or command-line utilities such as git.

Once adversaries gain access to a victim network or a private code repository, they may collect sensitive information such as proprietary source code or Unsecured Credentials contained within software's source code. Having access to software's source code may allow adversaries to develop Exploits, while credentials may provide access to additional resources using Valid Accounts.(Citation: Wired Uber Breach)(Citation: Krebs Adobe)

Note: This is distinct from Code Repositories, which focuses on conducting Reconnaissance via public code repositories.

Attack Flow

1. Attacker gains the prerequisite access or context described below.
2. Attacker executes Code Repositories to achieve its tactical objective (Collection).
3. Resulting access/data/effect is leveraged to advance the broader attack chain (see Related Techniques).

Prerequisites

• Platform(s): SaaS
• ATT&CK does not define one universal permission requirement for this technique. Establish the required access from the observed implementation and affected platform.

Common Tools

• Tool attribution is implementation-specific. Use ATT&CK procedure examples and local telemetry to identify the binaries, services, scripts, accounts, or cloud resources involved.

Commands

No universal command represents Code Repositories. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.

Network Traffic

• Network observability is implementation-dependent. Review DNS, proxy, firewall, flow, authentication, and packet telemetry around the activity window, then correlate remote endpoints and protocol behavior with host evidence.

Windows Events

Sysmon Events

Detection Opportunities

No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.

Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A

Sigma Rules

A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.

Splunk Queries

Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.

Investigation Workflow

1. Confirm that the observed behavior is consistent with Code Repositories and rule out expected administrative or application activity.
2. Establish the first-seen time, initiating identity, source system, target system, and affected resources.
3. Collect relevant host, identity, network, cloud, and application telemetry for the surrounding time window.
4. Correlate parent and child activity, remote connections, file or configuration changes, and related ATT&CK techniques.
5. Determine scope by searching for the same observable across peer assets and identities.
6. Preserve volatile evidence and record confidence, assumptions, and telemetry gaps before containment.

Containment

1. Isolate affected host(s)/account(s) identified during investigation.
2. Revoke or rotate any credentials/tokens potentially exposed.
3. Apply the mitigations listed below where not already enforced.
4. Validate no related techniques (see Related Techniques) were chained against the same asset.

Mitigation

• M1017 -- User Training: User Training involves educating employees and contractors on recognizing, reporting, and preventing cyber threats that rely on human interaction, such as phishing, social engineering, and other manipulative techniques.
• M1047 -- Audit: Auditing is the process of recording activity and systematically reviewing and analyzing the activity and system configurations.
• M1018 -- User Account Management: User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation.
• M1032 -- Multi-factor Authentication: Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enhances security by requiring users to provide at least two forms of verification to prove their identity before granting access.

Related Techniques

• T1005
• T1059.007
• T1071.001
• T1078.004
• T1082
• T1105
• T1195.001
• T1213
• T1528
• T1552.005
• T1555.006