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Messaging Applications (T1213.005) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Collection . Adversaries may leverage chat and messaging applications, such as Microsoft Teams, Google Chat, and Slack, to mine valuable information.
Messaging Applications (T1213.005) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Collection. Adversaries may leverage chat and messaging applications, such as Microsoft Teams, Google Chat, and Slack, to mine valuable information.
Attackers use Messaging Applications because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Collection tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on Office Suite, SaaS environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
Adversaries may leverage chat and messaging applications, such as Microsoft Teams, Google Chat, and Slack, to mine valuable information.
The following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on messaging applications:
In addition to exfiltrating data from messaging applications, adversaries may leverage data from chat messages in order to improve their targeting - for example, by learning more about an environment or evading ongoing incident response efforts.(Citation: Sentinel Labs NullBulge 2024)(Citation: Permiso Scattered Spider 2023)
No universal command represents Messaging Applications. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|---|---|
| Not universally applicable | Validate platform coverage | This technique may not produce a Windows event; use telemetry native to the affected platform. |
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.