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Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription (T1546.003) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Privilege Escalation, Persistence . Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instr…
Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription (T1546.003) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Privilege Escalation, Persistence. Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription.
Attackers use Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Privilege Escalation, Persistence tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on Windows environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time, user login, or the computer's uptime.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015)
Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system.(Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015)(Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) Adversaries may also compile WMI scripts – using mofcomp.exe –into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension) that can be used to create a malicious subscription.(Citation: Dell WMI Persistence)(Citation: Microsoft MOF May 2018)
WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges.
No universal command represents Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Relevant Windows channel(s) | Correlate authentication, process, object-access, and configuration events with the observed execution context. |
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.