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Udev Rules (T1546.017) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Persistence, Privilege Escalation . Adversaries may maintain persistence through executing malicious content triggered using udev rules.
Udev Rules (T1546.017) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Persistence, Privilege Escalation. Adversaries may maintain persistence through executing malicious content triggered using udev rules.
Attackers use Udev Rules because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Persistence, Privilege Escalation tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on Linux environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
Adversaries may maintain persistence through executing malicious content triggered using udev rules. Udev is the Linux kernel device manager that dynamically manages device nodes, handles access to pseudo-device files in the /dev directory, and responds to hardware events, such as when external devices like hard drives or keyboards are plugged in or removed. Udev uses rule files with match keys to specify the conditions a hardware event must meet and action keys to define the actions that should follow. Root permissions are required to create, modify, or delete rule files located in /etc/udev/rules.d/, /run/udev/rules.d/, /usr/lib/udev/rules.d/, /usr/local/lib/udev/rules.d/, and /lib/udev/rules.d/. Rule priority is determined by both directory and by the digit prefix in the rule filename.(Citation: Ignacio Udev research 2024)(Citation: Elastic Linux Persistence 2024)
Adversaries may abuse the udev subsystem by adding or modifying rules in udev rule files to execute malicious content. For example, an adversary may configure a rule to execute their binary each time the pseudo-device file, such as /dev/random, is accessed by an application. Although udev is limited to running short tasks and is restricted by systemd-udevd's sandbox (blocking network and filesystem access), attackers may use scripting commands under the action key RUN+= to detach and run the malicious content’s process in the background to bypass these controls.(Citation: Reichert aon sedexp 2024)
No universal command represents Udev Rules. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|---|---|
| Not universally applicable | Validate platform coverage | This technique may not produce a Windows event; use telemetry native to the affected platform. |
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.
No MITRE mitigations mapped to this technique.