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Port Monitors (T1547.010) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Persistence, Privilege Escalation . Adversaries may use port monitors to run an adversary supplied DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escalation.
Port Monitors (T1547.010) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Persistence, Privilege Escalation. Adversaries may use port monitors to run an adversary supplied DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escalation.
Attackers use Port Monitors because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Persistence, Privilege Escalation tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on Windows environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
Adversaries may use port monitors to run an adversary supplied DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escalation. A port monitor can be set through the <code>AddMonitor</code> API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup.(Citation: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in <code>C:\Windows\System32</code> and will be loaded and run by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, under SYSTEM level permissions on boot.(Citation: Bloxham)
Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to the Driver value of an existing or new arbitrarily named subkey of <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors</code>. The Registry key contains entries for the following:
No universal command represents Port Monitors. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Relevant Windows channel(s) | Correlate authentication, process, object-access, and configuration events with the observed execution context. |
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.
No MITRE mitigations mapped to this technique.