Credentials from Password Stores

Executive Summary

Credentials from Password Stores (T1555) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Credential Access. Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials.(Citation: F-Secure The Dukes) Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials.

Why Attackers Use It

Attackers use Credentials from Password Stores because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Credential Access tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.

MITRE Description

Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials.(Citation: F-Secure The Dukes) Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications and services that store passwords to make them easier for users to manage and maintain, such as password managers and cloud secrets vaults. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.

Attack Flow

1. Attacker gains the prerequisite access or context described below.
2. Attacker executes Credentials from Password Stores to achieve its tactical objective (Credential Access).
3. Resulting access/data/effect is leveraged to advance the broader attack chain (see Related Techniques).

Prerequisites

• Platform(s): IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
• ATT&CK does not define one universal permission requirement for this technique. Establish the required access from the observed implementation and affected platform.

Common Tools

• Tool attribution is implementation-specific. Use ATT&CK procedure examples and local telemetry to identify the binaries, services, scripts, accounts, or cloud resources involved.

Commands

No universal command represents Credentials from Password Stores. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.

Network Traffic

• Network observability is implementation-dependent. Review DNS, proxy, firewall, flow, authentication, and packet telemetry around the activity window, then correlate remote endpoints and protocol behavior with host evidence.

Windows Events

Sysmon Events

Detection Opportunities

No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.

Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A

Sigma Rules

A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.

Splunk Queries

Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.

Investigation Workflow

1. Confirm that the observed behavior is consistent with Credentials from Password Stores and rule out expected administrative or application activity.
2. Establish the first-seen time, initiating identity, source system, target system, and affected resources.
3. Collect relevant host, identity, network, cloud, and application telemetry for the surrounding time window.
4. Correlate parent and child activity, remote connections, file or configuration changes, and related ATT&CK techniques.
5. Determine scope by searching for the same observable across peer assets and identities.
6. Preserve volatile evidence and record confidence, assumptions, and telemetry gaps before containment.

Containment

1. Isolate affected host(s)/account(s) identified during investigation.
2. Revoke or rotate any credentials/tokens potentially exposed.
3. Apply the mitigations listed below where not already enforced.
4. Validate no related techniques (see Related Techniques) were chained against the same asset.

Mitigation

• M1026 -- Privileged Account Management: Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts).
• M1051 -- Update Software: Software updates ensure systems are protected against known vulnerabilities by applying patches and upgrades provided by vendors.
• M1027 -- Password Policies: Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts to reduce the likelihood of unauthorized access.

Related Techniques

• T1003.004
• T1003.005
• T1053.005
• T1056.001
• T1071.001
• T1082
• T1083
• T1105
• T1204.002
• T1552.006
• T1555.001
• T1555.002
• T1555.003
• T1555.004
• T1555.005
• T1555.006