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SSH Hijacking (T1563.001) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Lateral Movement . Adversaries may hijack a legitimate user's SSH session to move laterally within an environment.
SSH Hijacking (T1563.001) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Lateral Movement. Adversaries may hijack a legitimate user's SSH session to move laterally within an environment.
Attackers use SSH Hijacking because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Lateral Movement tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on Linux, macOS environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
Adversaries may hijack a legitimate user's SSH session to move laterally within an environment. Secure Shell (SSH) is a standard means of remote access on Linux and macOS systems. It allows a user to connect to another system via an encrypted tunnel, commonly authenticating through a password, certificate or the use of an asymmetric encryption key pair.
In order to move laterally from a compromised host, adversaries may take advantage of trust relationships established with other systems via public key authentication in active SSH sessions by hijacking an existing connection to another system. This may occur through compromising the SSH agent itself or by having access to the agent's socket. If an adversary is able to obtain root access, then hijacking SSH sessions is likely trivial.(Citation: Slideshare Abusing SSH)(Citation: SSHjack Blackhat)(Citation: Clockwork SSH Agent Hijacking)(Citation: Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack)
SSH Hijacking differs from use of SSH because it hijacks an existing SSH session rather than creating a new session using Valid Accounts.
No universal command represents SSH Hijacking. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|---|---|
| Not universally applicable | Validate platform coverage | This technique may not produce a Windows event; use telemetry native to the affected platform. |
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.