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Spearphishing Voice (T1598.004) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Reconnaissance . Adversaries may use voice communications to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting.
Spearphishing Voice (T1598.004) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Reconnaissance. Adversaries may use voice communications to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting.
Attackers use Spearphishing Voice because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Reconnaissance tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on PRE environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
Adversaries may use voice communications to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: Impersonation) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient.
All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. In this scenario, adversaries use phone calls to elicit sensitive information from victims. Known as voice phishing (or "vishing"), these communications can be manually executed by adversaries, hired call centers, or even automated via robocalls. Voice phishers may spoof their phone number while also posing as a trusted entity, such as a business partner or technical support staff.(Citation: BOA Telephone Scams)
Victims may also receive phishing messages that direct them to call a phone number ("callback phishing") where the adversary attempts to collect confidential information.(Citation: Avertium callback phishing)
Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Victim-Owned Websites) to tailor pretexts to be even more persuasive and believable for the victim.
No universal command represents Spearphishing Voice. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|---|---|
| Not universally applicable | Validate platform coverage | This technique may not produce a Windows event; use telemetry native to the affected platform. |
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.