Executive Summary
Data from Configuration Repository (T1602) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Collection. Adversaries may collect data related to managed devices from configuration repositories.
Why Attackers Use It
Attackers use Data from Configuration Repository because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Collection tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on Network Devices environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
MITRE Description
Adversaries may collect data related to managed devices from configuration repositories. Configuration repositories are used by management systems in order to configure, manage, and control data on remote systems. Configuration repositories may also facilitate remote access and administration of devices.
Adversaries may target these repositories in order to collect large quantities of sensitive system administration data. Data from configuration repositories may be exposed by various protocols and software and can store a wide variety of data, much of which may align with adversary Discovery objectives.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017)
Attack Flow
- Attacker gains the prerequisite access or context described below.
- Attacker executes Data from Configuration Repository to achieve its tactical objective (Collection).
- Resulting access/data/effect is leveraged to advance the broader attack chain (see Related Techniques).
Prerequisites
- Platform(s): Network Devices
- ATT&CK does not define one universal permission requirement for this technique. Establish the required access from the observed implementation and affected platform.
Common Tools
- Tool attribution is implementation-specific. Use ATT&CK procedure examples and local telemetry to identify the binaries, services, scripts, accounts, or cloud resources involved.
Commands
No universal command represents Data from Configuration Repository. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
Network Traffic
- Network observability is implementation-dependent. Review DNS, proxy, firewall, flow, authentication, and packet telemetry around the activity window, then correlate remote endpoints and protocol behavior with host evidence.
Windows Events
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|
| Not universally applicable | Validate platform coverage | This technique may not produce a Windows event; use telemetry native to the affected platform. |
Sysmon Events
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
Detection Opportunities
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
Sigma Rules
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Splunk Queries
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.
Investigation Workflow
- Confirm that the observed behavior is consistent with Data from Configuration Repository and rule out expected administrative or application activity.
- Establish the first-seen time, initiating identity, source system, target system, and affected resources.
- Collect relevant host, identity, network, cloud, and application telemetry for the surrounding time window.
- Correlate parent and child activity, remote connections, file or configuration changes, and related ATT&CK techniques.
- Determine scope by searching for the same observable across peer assets and identities.
- Preserve volatile evidence and record confidence, assumptions, and telemetry gaps before containment.
Containment
- Isolate affected host(s)/account(s) identified during investigation.
- Revoke or rotate any credentials/tokens potentially exposed.
- Apply the mitigations listed below where not already enforced.
- Validate no related techniques (see Related Techniques) were chained against the same asset.
Mitigation
- M1051 -- Update Software: Software updates ensure systems are protected against known vulnerabilities by applying patches and upgrades provided by vendors.
- M1054 -- Software Configuration: Software configuration refers to making security-focused adjustments to the settings of applications, middleware, databases, or other software to mitigate potential threats.
- M1030 -- Network Segmentation: Network segmentation involves dividing a network into smaller, isolated segments to control and limit the flow of traffic between devices, systems, and applications.
- M1037 -- Filter Network Traffic: Employ network appliances and endpoint software to filter ingress, egress, and lateral network traffic.
- M1031 -- Network Intrusion Prevention: Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries.
- M1041 -- Encrypt Sensitive Information: Protect sensitive information at rest, in transit, and during processing by using strong encryption algorithms.
Related Techniques