Forge Web Credentials

Executive Summary

Forge Web Credentials (T1606) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Credential Access. Adversaries may forge credential materials that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services.

Why Attackers Use It

Attackers use Forge Web Credentials because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Credential Access tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on SaaS, Windows, macOS, Linux, IaaS, Office Suite, Identity Provider environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.

MITRE Description

Adversaries may forge credential materials that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies, tokens, or other materials to authenticate and authorize user access.

Adversaries may generate these credential materials in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from Steal Web Session Cookie, Steal Application Access Token, and other similar behaviors in that the credentials are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users.

The generation of web credentials often requires secret values, such as passwords, Private Keys, or other cryptographic seed values.(Citation: GitHub AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator) Adversaries may also forge tokens by taking advantage of features such as the AssumeRole and GetFederationToken APIs in AWS, which allow users to request temporary security credentials (i.e., Temporary Elevated Cloud Access), or the zmprov gdpak command in Zimbra, which generates a pre-authentication key that can be used to generate tokens for any user in the domain.(Citation: AWS Temporary Security Credentials)(Citation: Zimbra Preauth)

Once forged, adversaries may use these web credentials to access resources (ex: Use Alternate Authentication Material), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)

Attack Flow

1. Attacker gains the prerequisite access or context described below.
2. Attacker executes Forge Web Credentials to achieve its tactical objective (Credential Access).
3. Resulting access/data/effect is leveraged to advance the broader attack chain (see Related Techniques).

Prerequisites

• Platform(s): SaaS, Windows, macOS, Linux, IaaS, Office Suite, Identity Provider
• ATT&CK does not define one universal permission requirement for this technique. Establish the required access from the observed implementation and affected platform.

Common Tools

• Tool attribution is implementation-specific. Use ATT&CK procedure examples and local telemetry to identify the binaries, services, scripts, accounts, or cloud resources involved.

Commands

No universal command represents Forge Web Credentials. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.

Network Traffic

• Network observability is implementation-dependent. Review DNS, proxy, firewall, flow, authentication, and packet telemetry around the activity window, then correlate remote endpoints and protocol behavior with host evidence.

Windows Events

Sysmon Events

Detection Opportunities

No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.

Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A

Sigma Rules

A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.

Splunk Queries

Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.

Investigation Workflow

1. Confirm that the observed behavior is consistent with Forge Web Credentials and rule out expected administrative or application activity.
2. Establish the first-seen time, initiating identity, source system, target system, and affected resources.
3. Collect relevant host, identity, network, cloud, and application telemetry for the surrounding time window.
4. Correlate parent and child activity, remote connections, file or configuration changes, and related ATT&CK techniques.
5. Determine scope by searching for the same observable across peer assets and identities.
6. Preserve volatile evidence and record confidence, assumptions, and telemetry gaps before containment.

Containment

1. Isolate affected host(s)/account(s) identified during investigation.
2. Revoke or rotate any credentials/tokens potentially exposed.
3. Apply the mitigations listed below where not already enforced.
4. Validate no related techniques (see Related Techniques) were chained against the same asset.

Mitigation

• M1026 -- Privileged Account Management: Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts).
• M1054 -- Software Configuration: Software configuration refers to making security-focused adjustments to the settings of applications, middleware, databases, or other software to mitigate potential threats.
• M1047 -- Audit: Auditing is the process of recording activity and systematically reviewing and analyzing the activity and system configurations.
• M1018 -- User Account Management: User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation.

Related Techniques

• T1606.001
• T1606.002