Loading AttackTrace...
Loading AttackTrace...
Network Share Connection Removal (T1070.005) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Stealth . Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation.
Network Share Connection Removal (T1070.005) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Stealth. Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation.
Attackers use Network Share Connection Removal because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Stealth tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on Windows environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation. Windows shared drive and SMB/Windows Admin Shares connections can be removed when no longer needed. Net is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the <code>net use \system\share /delete</code> command. (Citation: Technet Net Use)
No universal command represents Network Share Connection Removal. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Relevant Windows channel(s) | Correlate authentication, process, object-access, and configuration events with the observed execution context. |
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.
No MITRE mitigations mapped to this technique.