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Indicator Removal (T1070) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Stealth . Adversaries may selectively delete or modify artifacts generated to reduce indications of their presence and blend in with legitimate activity.
Indicator Removal (T1070) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Stealth. Adversaries may selectively delete or modify artifacts generated to reduce indications of their presence and blend in with legitimate activity.
Attackers use Indicator Removal because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Stealth tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on Containers, ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
Adversaries may selectively delete or modify artifacts generated to reduce indications of their presence and blend in with legitimate activity. Rather than broadly removing evidence, adversaries may target specific artifacts that appear anomalous or are likely to draw scrutiny, while leaving sufficient data intact to maintain the appearance of normal system behavior.
Artifacts such as command histories, log entries, or file metadata may be altered in ways that align with expected user or system activity. Location, format, and type of artifact (such as command or login history) are often platform-specific, allowing adversaries to tailor modifications that minimize suspicion.
These actions may not prevent detection entirely but can delay recognition of malicious activity or reduce the fidelity of alerts by making events appear benign or consistent with routine operations. Additionally, selectively removed or modified artifacts may still be recoverable through deeper forensic analysis, though their absence or alteration can complicate timeline reconstruction and attribution.
No universal command represents Indicator Removal. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Relevant Windows channel(s) | Correlate authentication, process, object-access, and configuration events with the observed execution context. |
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.