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Clear Network Connection History and Configurations (T1070.007) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Stealth . Adversaries may clear or remove evidence of malicious network connections in order to clean up traces of their operations.
Clear Network Connection History and Configurations (T1070.007) is a MITRE ATT&CK technique associated with Stealth. Adversaries may clear or remove evidence of malicious network connections in order to clean up traces of their operations.
Attackers use Clear Network Connection History and Configurations because it provides a reliable way to advance their objective within the Stealth tactic, often with a favorable balance of impact versus detectability on Linux, macOS, Windows, Network Devices environments. Defenders should assess this behavior in the context of the affected platform and adjacent activity rather than treating it as a standalone indicator.
Adversaries may clear or remove evidence of malicious network connections in order to clean up traces of their operations. Configuration settings as well as various artifacts that highlight connection history may be created on a system and/or in application logs from behaviors that require network connections, such as Remote Services or External Remote Services. Defenders may use these artifacts to monitor or otherwise analyze network connections created by adversaries.
Network connection history may be stored in various locations. For example, RDP connection history may be stored in Windows Registry values under (Citation: Microsoft RDP Removal):
Windows may also store information about recent RDP connections in files such as <code>C:\Users\%username%\Documents\Default.rdp</code> and C:\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Cache\.(Citation: Moran RDPieces) Similarly, macOS and Linux hosts may store information highlighting connection history in system logs (such as those stored in /Library/Logs and/or /var/log/).(Citation: Apple Culprit Access)(Citation: FreeDesktop Journal)(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)
Malicious network connections may also require changes to third-party applications or network configuration settings, such as Disable or Modify System Firewall or tampering to enable Proxy. Adversaries may delete or modify this data to conceal indicators and/or impede defensive analysis.
No universal command represents Clear Network Connection History and Configurations. Capture the exact command line, arguments, parent process, account, host, and execution time from the investigated environment; do not operationalize unverified examples.
| Event ID | Log Channel | What It Indicates |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Relevant Windows channel(s) | Correlate authentication, process, object-access, and configuration events with the observed execution context. |
| Sysmon Event ID | Name | Why It's Relevant Here |
|---|---|---|
| Environment-specific | Validate configured telemetry | Use process, network, file, registry, DNS, or image-load telemetry only when relevant and enabled. |
No MITRE detection guidance published for this technique.
Relevant ATT&CK Data Sources: N/A
A universal Sigma rule would create unreliable results because this technique has no single guaranteed observable. Build detection logic from a documented behavior and supported data source, scope it to the affected platform, and validate it against benign administrative activity before deployment.
Start with the data sources named in the detection section. Scope searches by asset, identity, and time window; correlate the primary behavior with preceding access and subsequent actions. A portable query is intentionally not provided where the technique lacks a universal schema or observable.